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ICANN 2.0: MEET THE NEW BOSS'
A. Michael Froomkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The articles in this Symposium each take a different approach to
the vexed problem of writing about an institution in the midst of
rapid evolution and reform. In the middle of 2002, when our authors
were drafting their contributions, the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)'s 2 emerging plans for a
1. The change, it had to come
We knew it all along
We were liberated from the fold, that's all
And the world looks just the same
And history ain't changed
I'll tip my hat to the new constitution
Take a bow for the new revolution
Meet the new boss
Same as the old boss
The Who, Won't Get FooledAgain, WHO'S NEXT (MCA Records 1971).
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to the
participants in this Symposium for their contributions, and for their comments
on parts of an earlier draft of this Introduction. For full disclosure of my
institutional affiliations relating to ICANN, see A. Michael Froomkin,
ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-Causes and (Partial) Cures,
67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 718 (2002), available at
http://personal.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/udrp.pdf.
2. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
describes itself as "the non-profit corporation that was formed to assume
responsibility for the IP address space allocation, protocol parameter
assignment, domain name system management, and root server system
management functions previously performed under U.S. Government contract
by IANA and other entities." About ICANN, at http://www.icann.org/
general/abouticann.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2003). For a richer description
see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
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new structure could plausibly have been projected as anything along
a continuum ranging from radical reform, to a simple purge of
dissidents, to moving the deck chairs on the Titanic. We had hoped
to encourage speculation about ICANN 2.0-what we then thought
of as the ICANN of the future. As happens with the Internet, that
hope was overrun by subsequent events, in this case ICANN's rapid
reaction to ICANN CEO Stuart Lynn's public statement that its
structure was unworkable, and that change was necessary.3 ICANN
2.0 was not going to be an academic exercise-it was happening
around us.
As the weeks passed, the nature of the change in store for
ICANN began to come into focus. However, even in early 2003,
certain key points relating to the composition and functioning of the
all-important "nominating committee" that will pick much of the
next ICANN Board remain uncertain. The delays inherent in
traditional "dead tree" legal scholarship thus created a danger that
any analysis of ICANN's future would be about ICANN's past
before the writing saw print. Indeed, any speculation about an
improved ICANN risked becoming overrun by events. This at first
fluid, and then increasingly inelastic, state of affairs created a
substantial intellectual and literary challenge. The contributors to
this Symposium have each risen to that challenge in a distinctive
way, but there are also some interesting commonalities in both
approach and focus, commonalities which reflect something real
about ICANN and about Internet legal scholarship.
II. THE CONTRIBUTIONS
In a remarkably efficient manner, Wolfgang Kleinwechter lays
out the main elements of the transformation from ICANN 1.0 to the
present. 4 Indeed, for anyone new to the subject-or anyone who
looked away for a short while-it would be hard to better his
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000), available at
http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/icann.pdf.
3. M. STUART LYNN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN-THE CASE FOR
REFORM (Feb. 24, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-
proposal-24feb02.htm.
4. See Wolfgang Kleinwechter, From Self-Governance to Public-Private
Partnership: The Changing Role of Governments in the Management of the
Internet's Core Resources, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1103 (2003).
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summary of the new state of affairs as it relates to the distribution of
the power over ICANN and thus the resources over which it has de
facto control: ICANN 2.0 looks like a deal between (some)
industries and (some) governments which sidelines the global
Internet users.5 His paper zeros in on one of the most important
features of the new ICANN-participating governments that
previously had (formally) only an advisory role are now to have a
virtual veto on the affairs of a private corporation. Both the old and
the new dispensation were peculiar, but the new one is an especially
odd state of affairs. Professor Kleinwechter is not sanguine about it,
observing that "[a] greater governmental role will not make global
Internet governance easier" 6 as increased influence over the Internet
may tempt governments to mischief. If governments are the winners
of the poisoned chalice of the domain name system (DNS) power
then, as Professor Kleinwechter also observes, "[t]he losers of the
present redistribution of power in cyberspace are the Internet users."
7
Here too, Professor Kleinwxchter is not too optimistic, for all
lessons from more than "[f]ifteen years of discussion on Internet
governance demonstrate that... mechanisms that exclude main
stakeholder-groups have difficulties functioning.
'" 8
The team of David R. Johnson, David Post, and Susan Crawford
(JP&C) also direct their attention to the intricacies of ICANN's
reform. 9 Rather than focusing on the composition of the Board, they
concentrate on how it will function. Their point of departure is the
new ICANN's alteration of the role of the Board and the consequent
change in the relationship between the corporation and those it
regulates. The new ICANN bylaws empower the Board to act
without, or even against, a consensus of those affected by the
decision. JP&C find this alarming, believing that "abandoning
consensus as the basis for ICANN policy-making is neither in
5. See id. at 1124.
6. Id. at 1122.
7. Id. at 1123.
8. Id. at 1124.
9. David R. Johnson, David Post & Susan P. Crawford, A Commentary on
the ICANN "Blueprint" for Evolution and Reform, 36 Loy. L.A. REv. 1127
(2003).
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ICANN's best interests nor in the best interests of the Internet
community."10
The JP&C paper provides close analysis of a legal text setting
out ICANN's proposed reform. Inside that legalistic structure,
however, we find a quite romantic approach to ICANN's past and
present, in both the positive and negative senses of that term. That
the Board's new power to act unilaterally represents a great change
from the text of most of the previous thirteen drafts of the ICANN
bylaws cannot be doubted."1 The authors see this as a watershed, and
if as a result ICANN now feels empowered to act unilaterally even
more frequently, they will be proven to be right. There is often a
difference, however, between the law on the books and the law on
the ground, and one might reasonably ask to what extent this new
muscular Board represents anything more than the codification of
ICANN's prior practices. The authors have been eloquent voices for
consensus policy-making, 12 but the evidence that ICANN has
actually ever engaged in consensus-finding, much less adhered to a
consensus, is fairly thin. Perhaps, on this point, the new bylaws are
simply truth in labeling.
JP&C's argument that the new bylaws represent a substantive
shift has two pillars. The first is their claim that the Board has, on at
least one occasion, come close to achieving consensus
10. Id. at 1127.
11. The current bylaws can be found at ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (2002), available at
http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm. Links to the thirteen previous
versions of the bylaws, spanning a period of just over four years, can be found
at ICANN, Bylaws Archives, at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws
(last updated Feb. 25, 2003).
12. See David R. Johnson & Susan P. Crawford, What an 1CANN
Consensus Report Should Look Like, available at http://www.icannwatch.org/
archive/what icann consensus shouldlooklike.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2003); David R. Johnson & Susan P. Crawford, What's Wrong With
ICANN-And How to Fix It, http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/whats_
wrongwithicann.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003); David R. Johnson & Susan
P. Crawford, Why Consensus Matters: The Theory Underlying ICANN's
Mandate to Set Policy for the Domain Name System, available at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/whyconsensusmatters.htm (Aug. 23,
2000); David Post, ICANN and the Consensus of the Internet Community,
available at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/icann-and-the-consensus_
of the community.htm (Aug. 20, 1999).
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policy-making. 13 Alas, their examplar is ICANN's adoption of the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). As the only person to
have participated in every phase of the development of the UDRP,
some of it as the closest thing to a consumer representative,' 4 1 found
the claim that "[the UDRP] was not vigorously opposed by any
substantially affected party"'15 somewhat at odds with my own
memories of the events. 16 The claim that the UDRP is "the closest
thing that ICANN has to a consensus policy' 17 risks romanticizing its
past. It is a claim that ICANN itself did not dare make at the time.'
8
Or worse, it may be true-and unintentionally ironic.
13. See Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 1130.
14. See A. Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking:
Lessons Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process, in REGULATING THE
GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 211 (Christopher T. Marsden ed., 2000),
available at http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/tprc99.pdf.
15. Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 1130.
16. See Froomkin, supra, note *; A. Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on
WIPO's: The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual
Property Issues, http://www.law.miami.edu/-amf/commentary.pdf. (May 17,
1999); A. Michael Froomkin, Comments on ICANN Uniform Dispute Policy: A
Catalog of Critical Process Failures; Progress on Substance; More Work
Needed, available at http://www.law.miami.edu/-amf/icann-udp.htm (Oct. 13,
1999).
17. Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 1130.
18. ICANN did not attempt to identify the UDRP as a consensus policy,
binding registrars or registries. It simply negotiated their submission to it: the
parties agreed to treat the UDRP as though it were a consensus policy. See,
e.g., ICANN, ICANN-NSI Registry Agreement Part 1(e), available at
http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm (last modified
Nov. 10, 1999) ("For all purposes under this Agreement, the policies identified
in Appendix A adopted by the ICANN Board of Directors before the effective
date of this Agreement shall be treated in the same manner and have the same
effect as 'Consensus Policies."'); id. at Appendix A, available at
http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-appa-04nov99.htm (listing
only UDRP) (last modified Nov. 8, 1999); see also David R. Johnson, Why A
General Assembly Matters, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/stockholm/
archive/johnson-ga.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
You'll notice there is only one actual 'consensus policy' currently
mentioned in the contracts. And that's the UDRP-sort of a
grandfathered deal that was worked out before the full mechanisms for
development of consensus policies-and enforcing them via
contracts-had been worked out... [I]t reflects a lack of work by
those in this room to engage in the true dialogue needed to find
commonly agreeable policy solutions to some real problems.
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JP&C's argument is romantic in another, more positive way.
This essay reminds us that there are and were people who had high
hopes for ICANN as a new, consensus-based form of governance.
The problem was that ICANN was never as good as they wanted it to
be. In that sense, the new structure truly is a watershed moment, for
it means that ICANN and its defenders have put aside even the
aspirational aspect of their project, set aside any revolutionary,
devolutionary, anti-government clothes which might have pinched
occasionally when they acted like rent-seekers. There is nothing
quite so mournful as a disappointed romantic, and more than a whiff
of this disappointment emanates from JP&C's somewhat sorrowful
account of ICANN's likely future-one where an assertive Board
runs headlong into its messy contractual obligations to refrain from
imposing non-consensus policies on the early registries and winds up
in court.
Dan Hunter's provocative article takes this disenchantment two
steps further: The fault is not in ICANN, but in ourselves, or rather
in our mistakenly believing that what romantics mean by
"democracy" represents our genuine political commitments. 9 If we
do not really believe in democracy as more than an "empty shell of a
concept," surely it would be unreasonable to demand that ICANN
adhere to some conception of that idea. Indeed, Hunter finds it
strange that ICANN critics demand that ICANN live up to its
commitments, suggesting that whatever its flaws (and he is
remarkably sanguine about them, claiming to find only "equivocal
evidence" of capture and bias), the ICANN bottom line has been
"reasonably open and responsive" and "more transparent and
accountable than the vast majority of' private non-profits and
especially for-profits. 20 These, he suggests, are the right standard of
comparison, not some idealized and unrealistic concept of
democracy which never was and never could be.
To the extent that Professor Hunter wants to persuade us that a
quasi-governmental, pseudo-international (but U.S.-based and
controlled) Internet-regulatory 2l entity such as ICANN was a lousy
19. See Dan Hunter, ICANN and the Concept of Democratic Deficit, 36
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1149 (2003).
20. Id. at 1159.
21. I refuse to call ICANN "Internet-based" since its staff and Board insist
on doing so much at the quarterly in-person meetings.
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platform on which to graft an online election, I think there will be
surprisingly few who disagree. Similarly, there is now broad but not
unanimous agreement that the task of running a high-quality online
open-ended election, at which ICANN failed so spectacularly, would
also have been beyond even people of good faith.22 The more
difficult question is what follows from this premise.
Once one decides an institution like ICANN cannot really be
democratic or accountable in any of the rich meanings of those
terms, it would seem to follow that one should not ask (or allow) that
institution to take on any of the social roles that we reserve for
democratic bodies, or for institutions accountable to democratic
bodies. However, Professor Hunter-invoking Getting Past
Democracy23-suggests that this is just more misguided
romanticism, because ICANN is really not much worse than the
largely undemocratic mechanisms that characterize the modem
administrative state, and it would be both churlish and unproductive
to replace one imperfect mechanism with another that is, at best, not
24much better. As someone who spent a couple of years in the
ICANN process, I can only say that I wish it were only as bad as the
average agency-and that there was some guarantee of due process,
or even the threat of judicial review for "arbitrary and capricious"
decisions.25  Few would quarrel with Getting Past Democracy's
focus on the need for thick description of what institutions actually
do, and how they do it. That Professor Hunter finds ICANN
adequate in this regard must be either because he has a very gloomy
22. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
23. See Hunter, supra note 19, at 1153-54 (relying on Edward L. Rubin,
Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (2001)).
24. Professor Hunter clearly is not troubled by my argument that the U.S.
government improperly subcontracted out the job of regulating the DNS. See
Froomkin, supra note 2. He responds that this critique is just a special form of
the more general complaint that "ICANN can only be legitimate if it becomes
democratic.... ." Hunter, supra note 19, at 1177. The very complaint he
wants to raise is unfounded because that particular idea of "democracy" is
Utopian. If this is a claim about ICANN only, it may well be correct, but it
hardly seems an answer to a critique of how the United States regulates and
governs.
25. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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view of ordinary agencies, or a somewhat rosy view of ICANN. The
paper admits either, or both, interpretations.
26
The Hunter, Kleinwechter, and JP&C papers are
straightforwardly ICANN-centric. Other actors appear, but our
authors' interest in them is in relation to the central protagonist. In
contrast, in the other two papers ICANN is not always center stage,
although like Hamlet's ghost, it is never far from our minds.
Herbert Burkert's poetic and metaphoric article 2 7 contains a
thick description of the institutional interests and motivations of the
European Union's course across the information ocean. This is
particularly useful for U.S. readers as the European Union is surely
the second most important governmental player in DNS politics after
the United States. In Professor Burkert's account, the E.U. (and
usually, the member states, which is not quite the same thing) had
three major strategic considerations relating to the DNS. First, the
E.U. sought to pry the DNS from the United States' control and force
it into a more internationalized control regime. ICANN was seen as
the furthest way-station on this journey to which the United States
could be coaxed.28 Second, the E.U. began to see ICANN matters
through the prism of its own increasing internal concerns relating to
E.U. democracy,29 transparency, and enhancement of economic
competition. Seen this way, both ICANN's internals and its
outputs began to look less ideal. Third, the E.U. strongly desired to
establish a .EU top-level domain (TLD), something that required first
internal agreement, then ICANN approval. 3'
These three policy objectives had two tactical consequences. On
the one hand, the short-term .EU objective proved difficult to
implement, both because of internal disputes as to who should run
the registry and dispute over the terms that would bind the registry.
26. See supra text accompanying note 20 (discussing Professor Hunter's
optimistic view of ICANN).
27. See Herbert Burkert, About a Different Kind of Water: An Attempt at
Describing and Understanding Some Elements of the European Union
Approach to ICANN, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1185 (2003).
28. See id. at 1193.
29. See id. at 1192-93.
30. The E.U.'s concern with process virtues such as legitimacy and
transparency in ICANN is not as visible from a distance as it seems to be from
up close.
31. See Burkert, supra note 27, at 1213.
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Lurking in the background were concerns about what a .EU registry
under the Commission's control might imply for the regulation of
E.U. member state's country code top-level domains (ccTLDs).
Together, these .EU issues inhibited the E.U. from playing as
assertive a role in ICANN matters as it might have. On the other
hand, if only because of the E.U. member states' substantial
representation at ICANN meetings, the E.U. encouraged the
assertiveness of the ICANN Governmental Affairs Committee
(GAC) even though this is one of the least transparent parts of
ICANN.32
Professor Burkert speculates that concerns with legitimacy and
transparency may increase the E.U.'s discomfort with treating the
DNS, via ICANN, as the "privatized" subject of California law or,
perhaps, of private international law. Instead, he wonders if there
might not be some way to transform the DNS into a subject of public
international law, an interest the E.U. signaled as early as its reply to
the Green Paper.33  The obvious way to achieve this would be
through a treaty, but even in the absence of one, Professor Burkert
sees possibilities for soft law,34 or an international regime analogous
to the rules of equitable participation in unique resources.3a Under
such a system, the United States might be considered the trustee of
the unique resource for the global community. 36 Yet, as Professor
Burkert has argued elsewhere, a state acting as trustee for such a
resource must administer it consistently with its domestic
law37 -something that I at least have argued is not currently the
case.
38
Consonant with the tone of JP&C's contribution, Professor
Burkert strikes a eulogistic note for ICANN's elections. Whether or
32. See id. at 1199-1200.
33. See id. at 1190.
34. See id. at 1229-31.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1231.
37. See Herbert Burkert, Panel Statement ICANN Study Circle,
Responsibility for ICANN-Stability and Legitimacy 1-2 (Feb. 4, 2001),
available at http://www.herbert-burkert.net/ARCHIV/Zurich-E.pdf.
38. See Froomkin, supra note 2; see also A. Michael Froomkin & Mark
Lemley, ICANN andAnti-Trust, 2003 ILL. L. REV. _ (forthcoming).
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not the intentionally sabotaged ICANN elections39 deserve to be
compared to Ezra Pound's glorious hour, ° it is intriguing to hear of
the tensions that the E.U. may feel as a result of the move away from
the election model. On the one hand, the new purely advisory
at-large class of membership will seem comfortable, familiar,
perhaps conducive to stability. On the other hand, it may be costly in
the legitimacy arena, a topic to which the E.U. has become sensitized
due to complaints about its own democratic deficit.4'
Stefan Bechtold's fascinating paper begins by instructing that
while "ICANN uses its technical control over the DNS as undue
leverage for policy and legal control ... over activities that depend
on the DNS," this is not a unique problem.42 Rather, this is but one
example of "governance problems that occur in a set of technologies
known as 'namespaces.' ' '43 His goal is nothing less than a general
theory of the relationship between technology and law as it relates to
namespaces-a general theory of namespace governance, although
the theory here is more of the input-output sort than a philosophy.
Bechtold's central observation is that "technical control over a
namespace creates levers for the intrusion of politics, policy, and
regulation," 44 although the degree of control will depend on many
factors including the "technological architecture" of the space
itself,45 notably whether the space is a "bottleneck namespace" in
which the assignment of names has to be controlled in some way.
But technology is not the sole determinant, and indeed the
technology we use is not preordained, as "namespaces are 'social
construct[s] ... [which] reflect the same biases as the culture that
39. See Ted Byfield, MAL metastasizes: ICANN in denial, ROVING
REPORTER, Jul. 27, 2000, at http://www.tbtf.com/rovingreporter/
icannl.html#13; Ted Byfield, ICANN: transparency through obscurity,
ROVING REPORTER, Oct. 5, 2000, at http://www.tbtf.com/rovingreporter/
icann2.html (Oct.5, 2000).
40. See Burkert, supra note 27, at 1237.
41. See id. at 1237.
42. Stefan Bechtold, Governance in Namespaces, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1239 (2003).
43. Id. at 1240.
44. Id. at 1244.
45. Id.
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creates"' them.46  Given the contingent nature of most social
constructs, it follows, therefore, that in namespace design too,
"history matters."
47
Bechtold modestly describes his paper as fundamentally
taxonomic, and to the extent that he eschews any overt policy
conclusions, that is perhaps an accurate self-assessment.
Nevertheless, it is a wide-ranging and thought-provoking taxonomy.
To mention only a few of the interesting juxtapositions, along the
way he compares ICANN's management of the DNS namespace to
Microsoft's management of the Microsoft Passport namespace,
discussing the interplay of contractual and technological controls.
4 8
Digital rights management (DRM), DNA sequence databases and
many others each are considered and classified.
Of particular interest in the ICANN context is Bechtold's
discussion of "federated namespaces" such as the telephone
networks, the Internet, and some P2P systems. 49 In a federated
namespace, different parts of the space are controlled by different
entities, all of which share a collective agreement to prevent any
overlap or collisions between their spaces. This seems an attractive
model for the DNS, as it offers increased possibilities for economic
and regulatory competition. Bechtold, however, is cautious. Mere
interconnection between participants in a federated namespace "does
not necessarily lead to well-functioning competition between them"
if there are prohibitively high switching costs.
50
Similarly, a comparison of the regulation of IP numbers and
"Ethernet address spaces" with the DNS shows that "[n]ame scarcity
may necessitate a coordination of the name assignment process" but
it does not "necessitate any tight control over other, policy-related
issues of the namespace." 51 This also sounds hopeful, although
Bechtold is too polite to point out the obvious: in theory, control
over IP numbers, and perhaps even ethernet address space, might
46. Id. at 1312 (quoting Hope A. Olson, Mapping Beyond Dewey's
Boundaries: Constructing Classificatory Space for Marginalized Domains, 47
LIBR. TRENDs 233 (1998)) (alterations in original).
47. Id. at 1303.
48. See id. at 1257.
49. See id. at 1275-83.
50. Id. at 1280.
51. Id. at 1288.
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also be leveraged to impose tighter control instead of the present
loose coordination.
Perhaps the most original observation in the paper is the
comparison of the DNS to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA)'s 52 management of "port number space., 53 Bechtold argues
that a critical element of the Internet's success is that twenty-five
percent of port number space remains permanently unallocated in
order to allow innovation in end-to-end applications. 54 He contrasts
this approach to the current management of the DNS, which-
alarmingly-he sees as leaning towards the architecture of DRM
schemes, the DNS being relatively information-rich, and showing
signs of possibly getting even richer.
55
Another cautionary tale with immediate implications is
Bechtold's account of library cataloging codes. The difficulties
caused by the cultural assumptions, and now anachronistic
assumptions, built into the Library of Congress bibliographic coding
system implicitly contains strong cautions for people who want
hierarchical semantic meaning coded into domain name space. The
ICANN Board's recent request that the GNSO Names Council make
a recommendation "on whether to structure the evolution of the
generic top-level namespace and, if so, how to do so," 56 was
understood by some as introducing the possibility of imposing
taxonomic namespaces; 57 it seems clear from Bechtold's paper that
this would be positively silly.
52. IANA, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, is the name given to
the job of assigning port numbers. Originally handled by Jon Postel and Joyce
Reynolds, it is now performed by ICANN pursuant to a contract with the U.S.
Department of Commerce. See Froomkin, supra note 2, at 85-87.
53. See Bechtold, supra note 42, at 1290 n.209.
54. See id. at 1290.
55. See ICANN, FINAL REPORT OF THE GNSO CoUNCIL's WHOIS TASK
FORCE: ACCURACY AND BULK ACCESS Part II, (Feb. 6, 2003), at
http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/20030206.WhoisTF-accuracy-and-
bulkaccess.html.
56. ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT: FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ICANN BOARD IN AMSTERDAM (Dec. 15, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/
minutes/prelim-report- 5decO2.htm.
57. See Posting of Danny Younger to ga@dnso.org, (Feb. 7, 2003), at
http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/ga/Arc12/msg00224.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2003).
1098
ICANN 2. 0: MEET THE NEW BOSS
III. SOME COMMONALITIES
Amidst all this diversity, however, there are common themes
that place all these essays firmly in the camp of second generation
Internet scholarship. The first commonality-a clean break from
exuberant first generation Internet scholarship5 8-- is a recognition
that we are not (or, in the case of JP&C, perhaps no longer) writing
on a blank slate and that the DNS wars are in no way sui generis
59
History defies and constrains our choices, in both the accumulated
toxins from ICANN's rocky first years and baggage imported from
external sources, such as the E.U.'s struggles with legitimacy and
transparency. 60  Thus, for example, both the Kleinwechter and
Burkert papers reflect the importance of institutional history.
Professor Burkert suggests that the coming transformation of ICANN
"along the lines of more traditional forms of government cooperation
must be seen as a contribution to 'taming cyberspace,' or as sort of a
belated fulfillment of... the 'law' of the suppression of radical
potential .... ,,61
The conclusion to Kleinwechter's paper goes farthest, inviting
us to view the DNS wars as part of a process akin to that by which
"new industrialists" extracted increasing degrees of self-rule from the
grasp of absolute monarchs. 62  Professor Kleinwechter finds his
analogy in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, drawing the
lesson that "the call is not to change the system but to increase its
58. First generation scholarship refers to the body of commentary which,
besides labeling the Internet as being an essential tool of democracy, would
generally believe that, the "Internet's libertarian culture and diffuse, packet-
switching architecture would guarantee that Internet conversation would
remain forever unencumbered by government regulation, proprietary control,
and commercial artifice." Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 447, 447-48 (2000). Consequently, if any regulation were to persist,
"that regulation would be 'bottom up'-that is, largely voluntary-rather than
'top down'-that is, imposed by the government." Thomas S. Ulen,
Democracy on the Line: A Review of Republic.corn by Cass Sunstein, 2001 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 317, 329 (2001).
59. One could argue that Milton Mueller's book, RULING THE ROOT at least
crystalized this revelation, and indeed may have helped cause it. See MILTON
L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING
OF CYBERSPACE (2002).
60. See Burkert, supra note 27, at 1237-38.
61. Id. at 1235.
62. See Kleinwechter, supra note 4, at 1125-26.
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flexibility for a changing economic environment." 63 Those of us
raised on a more Anglo-Saxon-centered curriculum may be unable to
savor this analogy without escaping the memory that there were
some calls to "change the system" and indeed some quite
revolutionary moments along the way.
A second near-commonality 64-- directly related to the first and
also placing at least most of these articles firmly in the second
generation camp 65-is a focus on the emerging role of governments
(note the plural!) in the DNS wars. As the U.S. government
continues, somewhat half-heartedly, to extricate, or seeks to be seen
as extricating itself from DNS management, other governments
clearly desire to play a more direct role. In this, Stuart Lynn's
original reform proposal-which offered governments seats on the
ICANN Board in exchange for agreement to use their coercive
powers to force ICANN's reluctant 'stakeholders' to pay its
levies66-may have been more prophetic than it seemed. If nothing
else, this coinmonality reflects something real about ICANN:
governments, via the GAC, are the big gainers in the new structure.
A third theme in at least most of the papers is that the ICANN
situation remains very fluid and politically unstable. While they may
disagree as to which were the lost opportunities, or even how good
those opportunities, though spurned, may have been, there does seem
to be some agreement among the papers directly discussing political
questions that ICANN's current reforms do not self-evidently solve
the problems Stuart Lynn, and many others, have identified.
IV. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
As all of these articles demonstrate in their own way, the dream
that ICANN may have once seemed the harbinger of a new
63. Id. at 1125.
64. Note that JP&C may not share in this attribute.
65. In contrast to first generation Internet scholarship, see supra note 58,
second generation scholarship suggests that the Internet "is not an unmitigated
force for good. Instead, the [n]et poses a fundamental danger to democracy."
Dan Hunter, Philippic.corn Republic.com by Cass Sunstein, 90 CAL. L. REV.
611, 611 (2002). Some (but not all!) second generation scholars go so far as to
conclude that the Internet's threat to democracy presents a "compelling case
for governmental regulation (top-down) of the Internet" if only "to keep that
medium open to expressive activity." Ulen, supra note 58, at 326.
66. See LYNN, supra note 3.
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decentralized form of government is quite firmly dead. While we
have not in any way resolved to our common satisfaction how to
manage the DNS, or what role an ICANN-like body should play in it,
the chance that anyone will point to ICANN as a model for the
regulation of anything else now seems comfortably small. We must
look elsewhere when dreaming of a computer-enhanced, legitimate,
participatory mode of government.
67
That leaves the vexed question with which we began: how to
govern the DNS itself. The articles in this Symposium contribute to
our understanding of the many constraints that define the solution
space, even if the solution itself remains frustratingly out of reach.
67. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a
Critical Theory ofCyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003).
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